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The Right Not To Know: An Autonomy Based Approach 
- A Response to Adorno
Dr Andorno and I have corresponded for some time on the question of a right not to 
know (genetic) information. I enjoyed reading his paper and I am struck by the 
degree of agreement that we share. We both agree—for example, that unsolicited 
knowledge can be a burden which can significantly compromise an individual’s
psychological integrity.  We both share a desire to respect individual self 
determination. Also we each consider it reasonable for individuals to choose not to 
receive potentially harmful information. I have already made these arguments, and 
more, elsewhere,1 but my starting point has not been autonomy, as advocated by 
Andorno, but rather privacy. In essence, my argument is that individuals enjoy, and 
are entitled to enjoy, a measure of psychological privacy which can be invaded by 
unwarranted disclosures of information (Laurie,1 pp 255–74).
The reason that I prefer privacy to autonomy is not because I have any wish to "deny 
people the right to self determination"2 but rather because I perceive deficiencies in 
the autonomy model. Indeed, my approach and that of Andorno are not mutually 
exclusive; it is simply that my approach is broader and encompasses some of the 
harder cases which an autonomy based approach cannot help us to resolve. Thus, 
most of the substance of Andorno’s approach is subsumed within my model. I have—
for example, no disagreement whatsoever with the view that if you have an indication 
that an individual would not wish to know then this wish should be respected. One 
might even establish novel means of discerning individuals’ wishes by establishing a 
register to record advance refusals, as Andorno suggests. What should happen, 
however, if there is no indication of an individual’s wishes? In such cases it is not 
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possible to approach the individual to ask: do you want to know, because, as Fletcher 
and Wertz poignantly observe: "There is no way...to exercise the choice of not 
knowing, because in the very process of asking ‘Do you want to know whether you 
are at risk’ the geneticist has already made the essence of the information known."3
If I have understood Andorno correctly, his model leaves this dilemma unresolved. 
His reluctance to adopt a broader approach stems, in part, from the charge that a 
decision not to disclose taken by a health care professional is paternalistic. To avoid
this accusation, Andorno conceptualises his "right not to know" as a means of 
enhancement of autonomy, whereby "the decision to know or not to know is not taken 
out of the hands of the patient by the doctor". I have three observations about this
approach. First, the patient centred focus cannot answer the Fletcher/Wertz scenario. 
Second, paternalism is not a homogenous practice and not all forms of paternalism are 
bad.4 Paternalism has become a dirty word with the rise in success of the principle of 
respect for autonomy. The desire to enforce this principle now dominates much 
ethical and medicolegal discourse, but it is disingenuous at the same time to deny the 
presence of paternalism and, at times, the value of certain forms of it. Most 
particularly, it must be recognised that the autonomy model cannot provide ethical and 
legal solutions to all medical dilemmas and I would argue that we are misguided in 
trying to make it do so. Finally, there is an irony in Dr Andorno’s paper because not 
only does he recognise a role for paternalism at various junctures, but his argument 
about enhancement of autonomy, and his defence of conduct directed towards 
facilitating patient choices is, in itself, a form of paternalism. See—for example: "it is 
the responsibility of the health care professional to assess the amount of information 
an individual wants and is able to deal with at a particular time". He also states: 
"...[l]et us recall that, for those cases in which the interest in not knowing seems clear, 
but no explicit choice has been made, we already have the concept of ‘therapeutic 
privilege’, which allows physicians to withhold information if, based on sound
medical judgment, they believe that divulging the information would be harmful to a 
depressed or unstable patient...".
He also asks "...how can doctors assume that patients’ relatives do not have an interest 
in knowing genetic information, which may be extremely important to them". I would 
respond that they cannot, nor should they. By the same token, I would add: how can 
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health care professionals assume that relatives would wish to know? Once again, I 
would respond that they cannot do so. This is precisely the essence of the dilemma—
a health care professional does not know one way or the other what relatives would or 
would not wish to know.
I do not assume that people do not want to know, as Dr Andorno suggests. Indeed, 
my position is quite the opposite. I challenge any assumptions about people’s wishes 
(Laurie,1 pp 257–61). I have, in fact, a serious concern about the current 
preoccupation with autonomy and about its ascendancy to the status of supreme
ethical principle in many quarters. I question this on a number of grounds, not least 
because it is an incomplete answer to many dilemmas and because it leads to 
limitations on our thinking about how to approach ethical quandaries such as those 
posed by an interest in not knowing. The limits are expressed by Andorno himself 
when he states: "...the exercise of an autonomous choice seems necessary for the 
functioning of the right not to know, because it is impossible to determine a priori the 
wish of the patient". The latter point may well be true, but Dr Andorno does not then 
go on to tell us how the harder cases should be dealt with where there is no prior 
indication of a patient’s wishes. His idea of a register is, as he himself admits, of
limited utility and should not lead to an assumption that people would want to know. 
If one accepts that individuals can be harmed by unsolicited disclosures and that some 
protection for psychological integrity is desirable, it is difficult, then, to draw a 
meaningful distinction between those who have exercised their autonomy and so enjoy 
protection and those who have not done so and so fall outside the autonomy based 
approach.
My privacy model advocates that because we cannot assume anything about what 
people want in the absence of actual knowledge about their wishes then a measure of 
caution should be exercised in taking disclosure decisions. Various factors should be 
weighed in the balance before disclosure is made, including the availability of a 
therapy or cure, the nature of the disease and its consequences, and any advance 
statements made by the patient in question, if available (Laurie,1 pp 261–4). Most 
specifically, however, there should be recognition of an interest in not knowing. As
Dr Andorno correctly identifies, this places the onus to demonstrate that some utility 
would come of the disclosure, on those who would seek to disclose. The presumption 
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is that individuals’ psychological privacy should be respected unless there is good
reason not to do so. Disclosures can be justified both in the interests of the individual 
herself and her relatives. Prior wishes should be respected but even in their absence a 
decision not to disclose may be reached to protect the individual’s privacy. This is 
undeniably a paternalistic approach; but the nature of the dilemma necessarily makes 
it so.
As a final caveat, I would question the use of the language of rights in this context. I 
myself am guilty of such usage, for it can often be a helpful form of shorthand in 
discussion. The details and implications of rights discourse sit uneasily, however, in 
the present circumstances, and for these reasons I agree with Dr Andorno that there 
should be no legal "right" not to know which can be enforced against family members 
(Laurie,1 p 265). A better approach, to my mind, is to talk of the interest that 
individuals might have in not knowing. On this basis, we might find that there is even 
less disagreement between myself and Dr Andorno.
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